Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 55
Number 1 Tributes to Jeffrey E. Lewis, Dean
Emeritus and Professor of Law (Fall 2010)

Article 15

2010

Case Study Research and International Tax Theory
Allison Christians
University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School, allison.christians@mcgill.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Allison Christians, Case Study Research and International Tax Theory, 55 St. Louis U. L.J. (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol55/iss1/15

This Critical Issues in Comparative & International Taxation is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CASE STUDY RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL TAX THEORY
ALLISON CHRISTIANS*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 332
I.

WHAT ARE “CASE STUDIES”?.................................................................. 333

II. CHOOSING TO STUDY A CASE: GOALS AND PURPOSES ............................ 340
A.

Disciplined Configurative Cases: Exemplifying an
Established Theory ...................................................................... 341

B.

Theory-Testing Cases: Assessing the Validity of Existing
Theories ....................................................................................... 345

C. Plausibility Probes: Testing a New Theory ................................. 347
D. Heuristic Cases: Identifying New Variables or Theories ............ 349
III. CHOOSING THE CASE: WHY THIS CASE? ................................................. 351
A.

Representative Cases ................................................................... 352

B.

Atypical or Deviant Cases ........................................................... 353

C. Crucial Cases .............................................................................. 354
D. Archetypal Cases ......................................................................... 355
IV. BUILDING THE CASE: METHODS AND SOURCES ....................................... 356
V. ASSESSING THE CASE ............................................................................... 363
CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 366

* Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. Thanks to Professors Kim Brooks,
Craig Boise, Art Cockfield, Steven Dean, Howard Erlanger, Kathryn Hendley, Diane Ring, Adam
Rosenzweig, and the participants of the Saint Louis University School of Law Sanford E.
Sarasohn Memorial Conference on Critical Issues in International and Comparative Taxation
(Apr. 9, 2010), for their helpful comments and suggestions.
331

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

332

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:331

INTRODUCTION
International income tax law, just like domestic tax law and law in general,
evolves through political, economic, and social contexts that are complex,
multifaceted, dynamic, and difficult to study systematically. Perhaps as a
result, the underlying theories of international income taxation have been
static—and unsatisfactory—since they first emerged in the early twentieth
century.1 Over the last ten years, legal scholars have begun to use what they
describe as “case studies” in an effort to develop better theories about how
governments can or should impose taxation on international activities.2 The
attributes and functions of case studies, while well-studied and documented in
other disciplines, have not been explored in tax law scholarship.
This article explores case study research in international tax law
scholarship and argues that legal scholars could significantly advance
international tax theory by approaching their case studies more explicitly and
more methodically. It advocates especially for an heuristic approach to case
study research, that is, one that employs qualitative social science research
methods with the primary goal of identifying new data and developing new
theoretical approaches for the study of international tax law. A more
methodical, qualitative approach to case studies would help legal scholars
more effectively test established international tax theories and assumptions,
reveal information that will help new theories and assumptions emerge, and
create new spaces for policy development in international tax law.
This article is thus a study of case studies. The goal is to investigate both
how and why legal scholars use case studies for developing theory in
international tax law, and to consider how qualitative case study research
principles and practices from other disciplines might inform the work
undertaken by legal scholars.3 As a result, much of this work describes the
1. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV.
261 (2001) (discussing the development of current international tax policy and suggesting how it
should be reexamined for the twenty-first century).
2. The use of the term “legal scholars” is intentionally limiting: this article focuses on the
use of case studies by academic writers whose principal or only training is in the study of law. As
a result, it omits many case studies on topics of international tax law undertaken by economists
and social scientists. See WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr. eds., 1990) [hereinafter
WORLD TAX REFORM] for a sampling of international tax law studies by economists and social
scientists. The authors of the case studies discussed in this article are full-time legal professors,
with three exceptions: Scott Budnick and Ben Seessel, now practicing attorneys, were law
students when they wrote their case studies, and Andrew Morriss has a joint appointment in the
law and business schools at his institution.
3. This article thus responds directly to earlier calls for legal scholars to engage in a more
multidisciplinary approach to the study of international tax law. See, e.g., Allison Christians et
al., Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 303
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case studies themselves, including a survey of the scholars’ stated assumptions
about the purpose and goals for engaging in the case studies, their approaches
to or methods of building the cases, and their statements about the applicability
or explanatory value of their case studies.
These descriptions are
contextualized by social science discourse on the use of case studies for theory
development.
Part I begins the inquiry with the criteria I used for choosing the
scholarship for this study and explores what is meant by the term “case study.”
Part II explores why legal scholars choose to study cases in their international
tax scholarship. Part III examines how these scholars decide what cases to
study. Part IV explores the approaches legal scholars have taken to present
their case studies in international tax law. Part V examines how international
tax law scholars assess the applicability or explanatory value of their case
studies and suggests that while the growing contribution of case studies to
international tax theory is exciting, legal scholars could engage in case studies
more productively by consulting the method-related considerations which
inform social science research.
I. WHAT ARE “CASE STUDIES”?
Beginning an inquiry into the use of case studies in international tax law
scholarship requires some explanation of what is meant by the term “case
study.” The term has not been explicitly defined by international tax law
scholars. In the language of social science, a case study is described as “not a
methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied.”4 In this view,
one must first determine what constitutes a “case” in order to decide whether a
case is being studied.5
Social science discourse includes rigorous debate about what might
constitute a case, with descriptions ranging from very broad to very specific

(2008) (“[T]ax scholarship should turn to fields such as international relations, organizational
theory, and political philosophy to provide a broader framework for understanding the rapid
changes that are taking place in tax policy and politics in the United States and around the
world.”); Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the
Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 368 (1998) (encouraging tax scholars to
expand beyond normativity to embrace empirical studies and narrative projects, using social
sciences to aid their research); Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications,
60 TAX L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2007) [hereinafter Ring, International Tax Relations] (calling for
integration of “important areas of nontax research into [the] universe” of international tax
scholarship).
4. Robert E. Stake, Qualitative Case Studies, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH 443, 443 (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter
THE SAGE HANDBOOK].
5. See id. at 444.
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criteria.6 In one view, a case is described in terms of its subject matter: What
counts as a case is a “phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a
single measure on any pertinent variable.”7 This subject-oriented description
permits a very broad view of cases, in which any study of a particular event or
phenomenon constitutes a case study.8 But most analyses of cases also require
a purposive element: A case is not defined simply by reference to a subject but
necessarily implies a purpose for undertaking the study.9 From this
perspective, a case may be described as “an instance of a class of events . . .
[which is] a phenomenon of scientific interest . . . that the investigator chooses
to study with the aim of developing theory (or ‘generic knowledge’) regarding
the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of
events.”10 The underlying premise is that the audience expects social science
research to demonstrate or explain a social phenomenon through the rigorous
and systematic study of cases.11
For purposes of analyzing the use of case studies in international tax law
scholarship, I began by identifying articles on the subject of international
taxation in which the authors explicitly referred to their content as a “case
study” (one of which is my own work).12 Not all of the authors of these
6. See generally Charles C. Ragin, Cases of “What is a Case?,” Introduction to WHAT IS A
CASE?: EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY 1, 2 (Charles C. Ragin & Howard S.
Becker eds., 1992) [hereinafter WHAT IS A CASE?] (discussing the wide-ranging application of the
term “case” to both qualitative and quantitative research conducted in the social sciences).
7. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 17 (2005) (describing this view as “[o]ne early
definition, still widely used” but increasingly rejected by political scientists); see also Harry
Eckstein, Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in 7 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY 79, 85 (Fred I. Grenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975).
8. See John S. Odell, Case Study Methods in International Political Economy, 2 INT’L
STUD. PERSP. 161, 162 (2001) (“What counts as a case can be as flexible as the researcher’s
definition of the subject. By a case I mean a single instance of an event or phenomenon, such as
a decision to devalue a currency, a trade negotiation, or an application of economic sanctions.”);
Ragin, supra note 6, at 2 (“At a minimum, every study is a case study because it is an analysis of
social phenomena specific to time and place.”).
9. See, e.g., GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 18 (“A case study is thus a well-defined
aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical
event itself.”).
10. Id. at 17–18.
11. Ragin, supra note 6, at 2.
12. Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income in a Global Economy: Stages in the
Development of International Income Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 631, 636 (2008); Scott
Budnick, Internet Taxation & Burkina Faso: A Case Study, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 549,
549 (2004); Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A
Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 639 (2005); Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for
the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 336
(2002) [hereinafter “Cockfield,” Digital Biosphere]; Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the
Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171,
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articles discuss the criteria by which they describe their work as a case study—
indeed, very few of them do. It may be debatable whether the research would
be considered to constitute case studies by scholars in other disciplines. Yet
for purposes of discovering why scholars might be using case studies in
international tax law scholarship, the fact that these scholars use the term “case
study” to describe what they are doing seems relevant.
This is not to say that the handful of articles discussed herein are the only
articles in which legal scholars use the term “case study” to describe their work
on the subject of international tax. First, my source of articles is generally
limited to legal scholars who publish in law reviews and journals that are
available in the databases maintained by LexisNexis and Westlaw.13 Any
article, book, monograph, or other material that is not published in a law
review or journal included in these databases, not cited by any of the authors of
the searched publications or not explicitly identified as a case study, is
therefore excluded.14 Second, because this article focuses on the use of case
studies for the purpose of developing theory in international tax law
scholarship, I omitted articles that use case studies solely for purposes of
description.15

1175 (2001) [hereinafter “Cockfield,” Transforming the Internet]; Steven A. Dean, Attractive
Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 411 (2005); Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 86;
Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44
B.C. L. REV. 79, 85 (2002) [hereinafter “Ring” One Nation]; Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in
the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 159
(2008) [hereinafter Sovereignty Debate]; Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of
International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555, 559 (2007); Ben Seessel, Comment, The
Bermuda Reinsurance ‘Loophole’: A Case Study of Tax Shelters and Tax Havens in the
Globalizing Economy, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 541, 543 (2001).
13. To identify case studies in international tax scholarship, I searched the legal scholarship
databases in LexisNexis and Westlaw for articles that included both the terms “international tax”
and “case study” (including variations). Of course, I also Googled “international tax case study,”
which yielded over ten million hits. A review of the first 1,000 hits (an admittedly arbitrary
sample) revealed most of the articles I had otherwise identified for this study, but no additional
articles meeting my selection criteria.
14. Because of these limitations, there are probably theory-developing international tax case
studies written by legal scholars, especially those outside of the United States and Canada, that I
have missed. I hope that as I continue this research, and discuss it with others, any such studies
will come to light.
15. For example, I excluded an article in which the author used what he identified as a case
study to investigate how profits from international Internet software sales would be taxed by the
United States in alternate scenarios involving the physical location of the server. See J. Clifton
Fleming Jr., US Income Taxation of Profits from Software Sales by Australian Vendors into the
US via the Internet, 4 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. ANN. 97, 97 (1999), reprinted in 19 TAX NOTES
INT’L 675 (1999) (providing a thorough description useful for subsequent studies, but not itself
purporting to develop theory).
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In addition to the self-identified international tax case studies, I identified
an additional article, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in Offshore
Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles (“The Saga of
the Netherlands Antilles”), as an international tax case study.16 This article
differs from the others in that it does not explicitly use the term “case study” to
describe its approach. Even so, I included it in my study, first, because it
embodies the case study concept in general, in some ways more so than the
self-identified case studies, and second, because it is the sole example of a
primarily heuristic approach—the authors undertook the case study for the
purpose of developing new information from which to draw and to test new
theoretical approaches to existing questions of international tax law.17 Perhaps
many additional international tax law articles could be described as case
studies to varying degrees. However, I chose each of the case studies
discussed herein for its unique approach to the studied topic, as discussed
below.
In the self-identifying case study articles chosen for this study, the authors
identified tax avoidance practices;18 a proposed set of legal rules;19 an existing
set of legal rules;20 the formation of a set of legal rules;21 a set of international
tax agreements;22 a proposed set of international standards;23 a country’s

16. Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in
Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 377
(2009).
17. Id. at 383 (using the experience of the Netherlands Antilles “as a lens through which to
examine” how “onshore” legal systems and “the international regulatory climate may affect other
international financial centers, both onshore and offshore”).
18. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 674 (using the issue of thin-capitalization or earningsstripping, a means of tax avoidance employed by multinational companies, as a case); Cockfield,
Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 367 (using the tax planning efforts of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
to reduce sales tax burdens on Walmart.com as a case); Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 90
(using four methods of international tax avoidance as cases); Seessel, supra note 12, at 543 (using
tax avoidance through reinsurance mechanisms as a case).
19. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1188 (using a draft proposal on
e-commerce taxation by an OECD working party as a case); Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra
note 12, at 206 (using European Union efforts to harmonize the corporate tax base as a case).
20. Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at 216 (using a WTO ruling against U.S.
export tax incentive rules as a case); Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 617 (using a set of legal
rules—the entity classification election regime—as a case).
21. Dean, supra note 12, at 411 (using “the creation of the 1996 check-the-box entity
classification regulations” as a case).
22. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 86 (using “the development of a
system to relieve double taxation” tax treaties as a case).
23. Id. at 122–23 (using United States participation in an OECD-led campaign to curb
harmful tax competition as a case).
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experience with a specific set of legal rules;24 and a hypothetical international
agreement25 as their “cases.” None of these articles defined the studied
phenomena or events as cases by reference to identifying criteria such as those
described above from the social science literature (i.e., chosen to serve a
specific scientific or intellectual purpose). In each case, the articles simply
identify the event or phenomenon as a “case” without further discussion. In
The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, the article that does not self-identify as a
case study, the case in question is the history that led the Netherlands Antilles
to become a notoriously famous tax haven.26
Are these cases? Does it matter whether they are or not? It might, if
defining the case as such helps scholars explain the goals and expectations
behind the decision to focus on a particular event or phenomenon.27 In the
social science literature, the debate over what constitutes a case takes place in
part because there is some concern about the purpose of undertaking the study,
as well as the reliability of the conclusions to be drawn from the study.28
These concerns ought to inform legal scholarship as well.
Social scientists suggest that one of the most problematic aspects of using
case study methods in scientific inquiry is the possibility that researchers may
choose unrepresentative or otherwise inappropriate cases to “prove” a specific
point.29 In statistical (quantitative) research, the problem with this tendency,
called “selection bias,” is that the researcher may choose subjects for study that
are not sufficiently random, causing doubt about the study’s conclusions. The
selection bias problem is what leads scientific researchers to caution one
another not to “select cases on the dependent variable”—that is, not to choose
only those cases that demonstrate the outcome sought for the research.30

24. Budnick, supra note 12, at 556 (using Burkina Faso’s experience with e-commerce tax
and tariff rules established by developed countries in the context of the WTO as a case).
25. Christians, supra note 12, at 666 (identifying a hypothesized tax treaty between the
United States and Ghana, based on other U.S. tax treaties with developing countries, as a case).
26. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 414–19.
27. Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The
Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1189 (2006) (“We must have some theories, or at least
organizing assumptions, that guide us in what we look for and ask.”).
28. See, e.g., Ragin, supra note 6, at 3–4.
29. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that case studies “are particularly
prone to versions of ‘selection bias’ that concern statistical researchers”); Christopher H. Achen
& Duncan Snidal, Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies, 41 WORLD POL.
143, 160 (1989); David Collier & James Mahoney, Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in
Qualitative Work, 49 WORLD POL. 56, 59 (1996) (“Selection bias is commonly understood as
occurring when some form of selection process in either the design of the study or the real-world
phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic error.”); Barbara
Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative
Politics, 2 POL. ANALYSIS 131, 131 (1990).
30. See, e.g., Collier & Mahoney, supra note 29, at 60.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

338

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:331

Selection bias is identified as a problem to the extent that the goal is to show
that one factor (variable) caused or is predicted to cause another.31 The
concern is that in choosing cases that exhibit selected features or outcomes, the
researcher might ignore contradictory cases or over-generalize from the
selected cases to wider populations.32 In other words, the particular case being
studied, which may or may not be representative, might cause us to either
overstate or understate the relationship between different aspects of the objects
of our study.33 This problem might be especially acute in tax scholarship,
since this scholarship (like much legal scholarship) is typically normative
rather than scientifically inquisitive in nature.34
The question this raises for international tax law scholars using case
studies (as for any researcher) is, thus, what can be learned both about and
from the event or phenomenon identified as the case.35 Selection bias may not
necessarily constitute a problem for case study research in international tax law
scholarship, but awareness of the possibility of bias might help tax law
scholars build their cases more explicitly and more persuasively. For instance,
a scholar might intentionally choose a case that exhibits particular features or a
particular outcome in order to make a point about those features or that
outcome.36 Legal scholars might take this approach because they wish to
identify variables that might lead to a selected outcome, or those that “are not
necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome.”37 In this
deductive structure of inquiry, the research starts with a broad theory or
question and searches for a case that demonstrates or explains.38
This perspective on choosing cases, while potentially quite useful, does not
describe how many legal scholars frame their research. Instead, it is typically
through the intense study of a specific legal rule or phenomenon that legal
scholars come to view the studied rule or phenomenon as a “case” that

31. In such a project, the social scientist seeks to show that “whatever variation is being
exploited for the purpose of investigating causal relationships is the product of the causal factor of
interest . . . and not of other confounding factors.” JOHN GERRING, CASE STUDY RESEARCH:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 212 (2007). The principle is termed “ceteris paribus,” or “all other
things being equal.” Id.
32. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 27, at 1186.
33. See, e.g., Collier & Mahoney, supra note 29, at 71–72.
34. See, e.g., GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 25 (“This form of selection bias is far
more common in political argumentation than in social science case studies.”).
35. Stake, supra note 4, at 443.
36. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 23 (observing that qualitative researchers might
intentionally “choose cases that share a particular outcome”); Ragin, supra note 6, at 5 (noting
that researchers normally define a problem broadly, identify relevant variables, and then collect
information on each variable).
37. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 23.
38. See Ragin, supra note 6, at 5.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

CASE STUDY RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL TAX THEORY

339

demonstrates or explains a theory or question.39 In this inductive structure of
inquiry, the theory or question emerges from the study of the case.40 This
approach forces the researcher to continually ask, “[w]hat is this a case of?”41
For some social scientists, this approach may be perceived to undertake case
selection in the abstract, a potentially problematic method of research design.42
For others, inductive empirical work is valuable because it leads to theoretical
discovery.43 The premise is that theoretical understanding emerges when data
is gathered gradually through successive rounds of inquiry on a specific
subject.44 This acceptance of inductive learning from case study is encouraging
for legal scholars, who learn from studying cases as an epistemological
matter.45 We are trained to gain knowledge by reading, analyzing, and
categorizing individual cases—albeit typically packaged in the form of judicial
opinions.46 Social science research can help us conceptualize cases more
broadly and understand them as reflecting social phenomena.47
Thinking in these terms about what defines a case might help international
tax law scholars more explicitly articulate our purposes in undertaking case
studies and, therefore, guide the reader, both in understanding the parameters
of the research and in judging the value of the case within these stated

39. Interview with Steven A. Dean, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., in Portland, Or.
(Mar. 31, 2010) (on file with author).
40. Ragin, supra note 6, at 6.
Strong preconceptions are likely to hamper conceptual development. Researchers
probably will not know what their cases are until the research . . . is virtually completed.
What it is a case of will coalesce gradually, sometimes catalytically, and the final
realization of the case’s nature may be the most important part of the interaction between
ideas and evidence.
Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. GERRING, supra note 31, at 71. From this perspective, since the purpose of all social
science research is to demonstrate or prove an inference, “[i]t is impossible to pose questions of
research design until one has at least a general idea of what one’s research question is.” Id.
43. See Douglas Harper, Small N’s and Community Case Studies, in WHAT IS A CASE?,
supra note 6, at 139, 139 (“[T]he deductive, natural science model, with specific hypothesis
testing and statistical analysis, may not allow us to see the most sociologically meaningful
boundaries of cases or the complexities of their social processes.”); Charles C. Ragin, “Casing”
and the Process of Social Inquiry, in WHAT IS A CASE?, supra note 6, at 217, 220 (“Emprical
research often proceeds without clear guidance from theory. . . . [C]ases often must be delimited
or found in the course of research. . . . Cases often must be found because they cannot be
specified beforehand.”).
44. Harper, supra note 43, at 141.
45. Reza Banakar & Max Travers, Law, Sociology and Method, in THEORY AND METHOD IN
SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH 1, 12 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2005).
46. Edmund M. Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 381 (1952) (quoting
Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17 A.B.A. REP. 473, 489 (1894)).
47. See Banakar & Travers, supra note 45, at 12–13.
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parameters. Whether choosing a case to study or deciding that a specific rule
or phenomenon is, in fact, a case of something, legal scholars inevitably—if
not explicitly—decide whether their case may or should be viewed as
applicable to other cases, and whether the case may be used to test an existing
theory or a new theory.48 The next sections examine these issues in more
detail, exploring how international tax scholars choose their cases, how they
approach their research, and what conclusions they draw from their research.
II. CHOOSING TO STUDY A CASE: GOALS AND PURPOSES
Why do scholars engage in case studies? From the perspective of social
science, a case study may be undertaken to describe or illustrate an event or
phenomenon that is intrinsically interesting,49 because the case is instrumental
in providing insight or drawing (or re-drawing) a generalization,50 or because
the case is one of many that may be compared for the purpose of investigating
“a phenomenon, population, or general condition.”51 One typology suggests
that case studies are undertaken “for identity, for explanation, or for control.”52
Perhaps most closely aligned with the study of law, case studies may be used
“to illustrate a point, a condition, or a category—something important for
instruction.”53 As these typologies suggest, not all case studies are undertaken
to develop theory. The international tax case studies discussed herein thus
represent a subset of a larger universe of case studies. This subset is the
subject of its own typology in the social science literature, which may be

48. See, e.g., GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75 (describing these issues in the design
of case study research).
49. Odell, supra note 8, at 163 (“Many cases are selected for investigation because they are
recent or seem intrinsically important. . . . Understanding crucial break points is as important as
testing any hypothesis that might be valid between them.”); Stake, supra note 4, at 445.
50. GEORGE & BENNETT supra note 7, at 5 (describing a case study as “the detailed
examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may
be generalizable to other events”); Odell, supra note 8, at 163 (“The disciplined interpretive case
study interprets or explains an event by applying a known theory to the new terrain.”); Stake,
supra note 4, at 445.
51. Stake, supra note 4, at 445. Stake defines the third approach above as a multiple or
collective case study and describes it as an “instrumental study extended to several cases,” in
which the cases are chosen “because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better
understanding, and perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases.” Id. at 446.
See also Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 85 (exemplifying a multiple or collective case
study).
52. Harrison C. White, Cases are for Identity, for Explanation, or for Control, in WHAT IS A
CASE?, supra note 6, at 83, 83. Of course, these are not exclusive: “Reports and authors often do
not fit neatly into the three categories.” Stake, supra note 4, at 447.
53. Stake, supra note 4, at 447 (citation omitted). “For decades, professors in law schools
and business schools have paraded cases in this manner.” Id.
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useful in considering the reasons why international tax law scholars might be
turning to case studies in developing their scholarship.54
The typology of theory-building studies includes four types of cases that
seem to typify the purposes for which the international tax case studies were
undertaken: “disciplined configurative,” “theory testing,” “plausibility probes,”
and “heuristic.”55 Each of these types of cases is described below in the
context of the international tax case studies that seem to reflect these profiles.56
Many of the studies can be described by more than one of these four types,
even though some scientists might argue that, in social science terms, some or
all of these projects fail to qualify as case studies at all. Legal analysis is not
social science research, and it is not suggested here that these international tax
case studies meet the rigorous standards of social science research methods or
methodologies. Instead, the purpose of this characterizing exercise is both to
explore the reasons legal scholars might engage in case studies to develop
international tax theory and to suggest that legal scholars could do a better job
of clearly identifying their purposes in undertaking a given study, giving
readers—including other researchers and policymakers—a better
understanding of the value of this type of research.
A.

Disciplined Configurative Cases: Exemplifying an Established Theory

In keeping with the theme that in the legal context, case studies are often
used to illustrate a point, six of the international tax case studies appear to fit
the description of “disciplined configurative cases.” These are studies
undertaken for the purpose of using established international tax theories in
order to explain the existence or evolution of legal rules and practices. The six
articles that seem to fit this profile are The Quest to Tax Interest Income:
Stages in the Development of International Taxation (“Stages of International
Taxation”);57 Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: a Case Study in

54. See generally GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75 (outlining what qualifies as a
“disciplined configurative” case study); Eckstein, supra note 7 (discussing case study method in
political science); Arend Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, 65 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 682 (1971) (discussing comparative politics methodology vis-à-vis traditional
political science methodology).
55. See GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75. George and Bennett include two
additional types of cases in their typology, namely “[a]theoretical/configurative idiographic case
studies,” which are described as “good descriptions” that “do not cumulate or contribute directly
to theory,” and “[b]uilding block” studies that “identify common patterns or serve a particular
kind of heuristic purpose.” Id. at 75–76. Other researchers have used different variations of these
terms. Because they do not directly affect or develop theory, I have omitted atheoretical case
studies from my analysis; I have also omitted the building block category because I have not
identified any case studies that seem to fit this particular type.
56. Of course, most of the case studies fit in more than one category to relative degrees.
57. See Benshalom, supra note 12.
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E-commerce Taxation (“Transforming the Internet”);58 Designing Tax Policy
for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws (“Digital
Biosphere”);59 One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border
Tax Arbitrage (“One Nation”);60 What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?:
International Tax and the Nation-State (“The Sovereignty Debate”);61 and The
Bermuda Reinsurance ‘Loophole’: A Case Study of Tax Shelter and Tax
Havens in the Globalizing Economy (“The Bermuda Loophole”).62 Most of
these case studies are principally descriptive or illustrative in nature, and most
appear to undertake the description because the case is viewed as a historically
important event or phenomenon.
Thus, Stages of International Taxation by Professor Ilan Benshalom seems
to fit the profile of a disciplined configurative case study because its goal is to
explain a set of rules—known as thin capitalization or earnings-stripping—as a
historically important sequence of stages in international tax policy.63 The
author uses the case to “demonstrate[] the problems” of the anti-avoidance
paradigm.64 The article also uses the case to exemplify the author’s new
paradigmatic stage theory for understanding the international tax regime.65
The case of thin capitalization rules thus also may be used as a preliminary
study to test a new theory, described below as a plausibility probe.66
Similarly, Transforming the Internet and Digital Biosphere, both by
Professor Arthur Cockfield, undertake case studies to use established
international tax theory to explain the complications created by e-commerce.67
The cases are different in kind: in Transforming the Internet, the case is a draft
proposal on e-commerce taxation by an OECD working party,68 while in
Digital Biosphere, the case involves tax planning efforts by Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. to reduce sales tax burdens on its online business.69 However, both case
studies share the goal of explaining how established international tax theory
58. See Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12.
59. See Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12.
60. See Ring, One Nation, supra note 12.
61. See Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12.
62. See Seessel, supra note 12.
63. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 636 (“Part VI uses the [earnings-stripping rules] as a casestudy to assess critically whether the anti-avoidance paradigm met any of its feasible
objectives.”).
64. Id. at 676.
65. Id. at 636 (arguing that the failure of the earnings-stripping rules “is directly derived
from the tottery foundations of the Anti-Avoidance Phase and, as such, is reflective of a more
profound systemic failure in the [international income tax regime]”).
66. See infra notes 103–17 and accompanying text.
67. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 333; Cockfield, Transforming the
Internet, supra note 12, at 1174–75.
68. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1187–92.
69. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 336.
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fails in the context of e-commerce because the established theory involves
assumptions about the nature of goods that are fundamentally incompatible
with the nature of modern commercial practices.70
One Nation and The Sovereignty Debate, both by Diane Ring, are also
disciplined configurative case studies.71 In One Nation, Ring uses established
international tax theories to explain the existence of four case studies of
various tax arbitrage techniques.72 The article explains that these four cases
may not necessarily be intrinsically important, but that they exemplify the
character of international tax phenomena.73 Ring then analyzes the four cases
from the perspective of conventional international tax policy theory, on the
basis of efficiency, equity, and revenue impact.74
Finally, The Bermuda Loophole also seems to fit the profile of a
disciplined configurative case study.75 This article seeks to show how
established international tax theory about what constitutes economic substance
in tax transactions caused the United States legislature to adopt a set of legal
rules specific to insurance companies, thereby allowing the proliferation of a
certain type of tax shelter.76 The article does not address explicitly the
question of whether the case in question—“the process whereby Bermuda
property and casualty insurance companies avoid U.S. taxation”77—is
considered a historically important or an exemplary case.
The common theme of these six articles is that their use of case studies
might be characterized as an extension of, or a variation on, what we might
consider a standard approach to tax law scholarship—namely, the use of
specific examples to demonstrate or prove a point. The examples are drawn
from the statutes, regulations, treaties, court cases, and other materials that

70. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 385 (concluding that the case study
shows “how traditional tax laws that emphasize control over geographic space fail to achieve the
appropriate balance within the digital biosphere”); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra
note 12, at 1175–76 (“The purpose of the case study is to demonstrate how the virtual world can
subvert legal rules that rely on traditional tax principles that govern physical space.”).
71. See Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 90; Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at
159.
72. Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 90.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 90, 101. The article also explores the impact of these arbitrage techniques on a less
conventional theory of political accountability, but acknowledges this analysis may be part of the
traditional efficiency/equity analysis. Id. at 101.
75. See generally Seessel, supra note 12 (discussing the Bermuda loophole, its cause, and
potential solutions). This article does not explicitly discuss its goals in undertaking the case
study, nor does it assess whether the studied case provides insights or draws conclusions.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 543.
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constitute the primary sources in tax law scholarship.78 The use of the term
“case study” might be merely a signal that the author intends to make a more
convincing case than that which may be achieved with a simple recitation of
examples.79 However, the reason to use a case study appears to be more than
simply fleshing out an example more concretely.80 As one author explained, “I
would say that people use the term ‘case study’ deliberately, as opposed to
‘example.’ I think it means something different than ‘example,’ and we know
it means something different than ‘example.’ . . . It is not merely descriptive.
It cannot stand alone.”81
Disciplined configurative cases may be most prevalent in international tax
law scholarship, because a primary goal of this kind of case study is to explain
why an event occurred or a phenomenon exists.82 Explaining phenomena—
especially in relation to how international tax law actually works—is
something international tax scholars spend a lot of time working on.83 This is
probably because the system of international tax law is widely viewed as
enormously complex, multifaceted, and even incoherent.84 In-depth study of
specific events or phenomena may be the best means of translating the abstract
construction of international tax theory into a coherent discussion.
Documenting what actually happens as a result of international tax rules may
be an effective way to lend credibility to a policy argument advanced in the
context of such complexity, or to highlight areas needing theory
development.85

78. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 12 (examining treaties); Cockfield, Digital Biosphere,
supra note 12, at 334 (examining a statute); Dean, supra note 12 (evaluating regulations);
Seessel, supra note 12, at 548 (examining a court case).
79. One author suggests that the term signals intellectual credentials that may or may not be
justified from the methodological approach. Interview with Steven A. Dean, supra note 39 (“I
think the real reason to use ‘case study’ is it sounds fancier than ‘example.’ It lends academic
credence, and it’s pretentious.”).
80. In the words of one author, a case study is “the opposite of traditional doctrinal research,
which is to say let’s look at a bunch of cases, find the common theme, and explain why that has
become the law.” Interview with Adam H. Rosenzweig, Assoc. Professor of Law, Wash. Univ.
Sch. of Law, in Portland, Or. (Mar. 31, 2010) (on file with author).
81. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Ring, Professor of Law, Bos. Coll. Law Sch. (Feb.
23, 2010) (on file with author).
82. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75.
83. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 12, at 643; Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12,
at 333–34.
84. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 1, at 264; see generally Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence
of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (discussing the history and
development of the current international taxation system).
85. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 99. In this way, disciplined configurative cases may serve
heuristic purposes as well. See infra notes 118–29 and accompanying text.
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Theory-Testing Cases: Assessing the Validity of Existing Theories

After the disciplined configurative case studies, the second most common
type of case study observed in the international tax law scholarship fits the
profile of “theory-testing case studies.” In the social science literature, theorytesting case studies are typically described as deductive: The study begins with
an established theory and tries to assess its validity by presenting test cases.86
The test cases may be chosen because they seem likely to prove the theory but
fail to do so, or because they seem likely to disprove the theory but do not do
so.87 Inductive theory-testing is also possible: study of a case may reveal
information that allows a theory to emerge. Three of the international tax law
case studies appear to employ a theory-testing approach: Internet Taxation &
Burkina Faso: A Case Study (“Internet Taxation”),88 Tax Treaties for
Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study (“Tax Treaties for
Investment and Aid”),89 and Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the
Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification (“Attractive
Complexity”).90
Each article is primarily deductive in nature, using cases to explore the
validity of an existing theory. However, the articles include some inductive
approaches. Internet Taxation addresses the theory that a World Trade
Organization (WTO) ban on e-commerce taxation will hurt developing
countries by examining the impact of the WTO ban on one developing country,
Burkina Faso.91 Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid addresses the theory that
tax treaties will improve investment flows between developed and developing
countries by examining the likely impact of a tax treaty if concluded between
the United States and one developing country, Ghana.92 Attractive Complexity
addresses the theory that taxpayers abhor complexity in the tax code by
examining the development of rules for classifying entities according to type
for tax purposes.93
Each of these case studies suggests that the established theory does not
hold when applied to the given case. In each article, the case is a vehicle both
for demonstrating that the given theory is insupportable in the context of given
facts and for advancing an alternative theory. Thus, in Internet Taxation, the
86. See GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75.
87. That is, they are “crucial cases.” See, infra text accompanying notes 153–63, for a
discussion of these terms in connection with the reasons for choosing a specific case for study.
88. Budnick, supra note 12.
89. Christians, supra note 12.
90. Dean, supra note 12. This article also appears to exemplify two other types of case
studies, namely, plausibility probes and heuristic cases. See infra notes 103–29 and
accompanying text.
91. Budnick, supra note 12, at 553–54.
92. Christians, supra note 12, at 643.
93. Dean, supra note 12, at 466–67.
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case is offered both to show that developing countries will not necessarily be
adversely affected by the WTO ban on internet taxation and to suggest the
validity of an alternative theory, namely that the WTO ban is generally neutral
with respect to its effect on the tax revenues of developing countries.94
Similarly, in Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid, the case is offered both to
show that developing countries will not necessarily be aided by the existence
of tax treaties with developed countries and to suggest the validity of the
alternative theory, that tax treaties between developing and developed
countries are largely symbolic.95 Finally, in Attractive Complexity, the case is
offered both to show that taxpayers do not consistently abhor complexity and
to suggest the validity of the alternative theory, that taxpayers express an
abhorrence of complexity when they wish to convey an abhorrence of
regulation.96
Positing the failure of one theory and suggesting the validity of another is
not the only function of these theory-testing international tax law case studies,
however. Each of these three case studies also suggests that recognizing that
the established theory has failed can or should impact policy-making going
forward.97 Thus, the purpose for testing the theory is not limited to disproving
one theory or advancing another, but also quite explicitly to suggest that the
knowledge of the failure of the theory should prompt responsive reaction from
tax lawmakers. Internet Taxation argues that since the case study suggests the
WTO ban should be seen as neutral with respect to Burkina Faso, the ban
should “remain in place as presently formulated,” opposing proposals to lift
it.98 Similarly, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid suggests that based on the
strength of the case study involving Ghana, policymakers should approach tax
treaties between developing and developed countries with a high degree of
skepticism, despite the overwhelming support for such treaties.99 Finally,
Attractive Complexity states that based on the strength of the story of how
entity classification rules developed, policymakers should be critical of
taxpayer calls for simplicity in international tax law, contradicting the accepted
wisdom that simplicity is a normatively valid tax policy goal.100

94. Budnick, supra note 12, at 569.
95. Christians, supra note 12, at 644.
96. Dean, supra note 12, at 466–67.
97. Budnick, supra note 12, at 569; Christians, supra note 12, at 712–13; Dean, supra note
12, at 467.
98. Budnick, supra note 12, at 569.
99. Christians, supra note 12, at 712–13 (“[E]very potential tax treaty relationship with
[Less Developed Countries] should be approached critically. . . . [I]t should not be pursued . . . in
a myopic adherence to traditional notions . . . .”).
100. Dean, supra note 12, at 467 (“Recognizing that rational taxpayers will sometimes prefer
complexity over simplicity will help prevent attractive complexity from undermining the success
of efforts to simplify the tax law.”).
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In this way, the theory-testing international tax case studies are similar to
their disciplined configurative counterparts: In both types of case studies, legal
scholars tend to use the case study to advance a policy position. This should
not be surprising given the general advocacy nature of legal scholarship.101 As
such, thinking about these case studies from the perspective of scientific
approaches to building knowledge may help legal scholars to be more explicit
about what they are trying to accomplish. None of the three case studies here
identified as theory-testing describes itself as such, and thus, none explicitly
addresses the question of whether and why the chosen case is suitable for
disproving the posited theory, or how much confidence the reader can have in
the policy prescription. International tax scholarship, and in turn international
tax policy discourse, could be served by answering this question more
systematically.102
C. Plausibility Probes: Testing a New Theory
Like theory-testing case studies, plausibility probes set out to test a theory.
However, in the case of plausibility probes, the selected theory is new or
relatively untested rather than established.103 In the social science context, the
case is used to demonstrate that the new or untested theory deserves additional
testing.104 Translated to international tax law scholarship, where “testing” is a
fairly unfamiliar endeavor, a plausibility probing case study might be designed
to show that the new or untested theory should be applied to other contexts to
determine if it seems accurate or holds true across cases.105 In the international
tax case study literature, two articles seem primarily designed as plausibility
probes: International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications (“International
Tax Relations”)106 and Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage
(“Harnessing Tax Arbitrage”).107
International Tax Relations begins with the conventional view that the
international tax regime is incoherent and argues that regime theory from the
discipline of international relations should be applied to bring “coherence and
organization” to the field.108 The article suggests that international tax scholars
have a difficult time conceptualizing and theorizing international tax because
101. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 3, at 399.
102. Perhaps the most interesting and significant aspect of these cases, however, is that while
their theory testing appears from its final presentation in written form to have been conducted
deductively, the authors developed their theories through empirical study of the cases. See
discussion infra, Part III.
103. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 152–53.
106. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3.
107. Rosenzweig, supra note 12.
108. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 151.
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they are not using relevant tools from the discipline of international relations,
where scholars’ central questions concern relationships between countries.109
The article uses the international income tax treaty regime “to assess regime
theory as an explanatory model” of the failure of conventional international tax
theory to answer some fundamental questions about the structure and
implications of existing international tax rules.110 The purpose of the case
study is to test whether regime theory provides explanations that are different
from those obtainable through conventional theoretical approaches.
A similar yet distinct purpose and approach is evident in Harnessing Tax
Arbitrage.111 This article begins with the conventional theory that current
international tax rules are incapable of preventing international tax arbitrage.112
The case, the same entity classification rules that formed the case study in
Attractive Complexity discussed above, is provided in this article to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the approach to arbitrage under existing
international tax theory.113 Unlike International Tax Relations, which suggests
that existing international tax theory fails to understand the nature and
character of its own regime,114 Harnessing Tax Arbitrage does not argue that
the existing theory is faulty in its understanding of the issue of arbitrage.
Rather, Harnessing Tax Arbitrage argues that conventional international tax
theory is capable of identifying, but simply fails to address, the given
problem.115 The purpose of using the case is both to demonstrate that the
existing international tax rules will not curb the identified problem, and to
propose an alternative substantive solution. The case study thus does not
challenge existing international tax theory as such, but tests the author’s
suggested new approach to solving the identified problem.
In this way, Harnessing Tax Arbitrage is similar to much tax law
scholarship and much legal scholarship in general. Its purpose is to serve as a
testing ground for a proposed substantive law change, much like a set of facts
(real or hypothetical) might be used to test the validity of a proposed statutory
revision or a proposed judicial balancing test. Yet, as in the case of the
disciplined configurative cases discussed above, the use of the case study
appears distinctive from the conventional approach to international tax legal

109. Id. at 84–85; Interview with Diane M. Ring, supra note 81 (“I did believe that IR theory
is relevant, the idea of trying to understand how governments and other forces at the international
level interact with each other, and including a subset of actions that might result in regimes, has
to be relevant [to the study of the international tax regime] because this is the body of literature
that asks questions about those relationships.”).
110. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 114.
111. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 558.
112. Id. at 557.
113. Id. at 620.
114. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 84–85.
115. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 558.
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scholarship. The author has reasons for closely studying a particular set of
rules, rather than a hypothetical fact pattern or a mere “example,” to test a
proposed substantive doctrinal approach. Explicitly addressing these reasons
in the scholarship may help the reader assess the value of the proposed
approach. Thus, with respect to International Tax Relations, Professor Ring
suggests that her decision to use case studies to explore the validity of a regime
theory approach to international taxation was motivated by the desire to
contextualize the abstraction of a new idea—international relations theory—to
a known audience, i.e., international tax scholars.116 The case studies provided
a way to use known and important issues to show scholars in the field that the
new theoretical approach was relevant, meaningful, and one the readers could
readily absorb.117
D. Heuristic Cases: Identifying New Variables or Theories
The final category of theory-developing case studies in international tax
law scholarship is that of heuristic case studies. Heuristic case studies are
described as those that “inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal
mechanisms, and causal paths.”118 As discussed above in the context of
disciplined configurative case studies, heuristic case studies may be undertaken
for the purpose of showing that existing theories inadequately explain observed
phenomena.119 The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles appears to be the sole
international tax law case study to exemplify the heuristic approach to case
studies.120 The primary contribution of this article is to introduce new
variables by producing a narrative that includes several historical events and
contextual phenomena that have not been described or illustrated elsewhere in
the tax literature. The authors then use these events and phenomena to
introduce new theories to the tax literature regarding the historical role tax
havens played as financial markets became increasingly globalized, especially
during World War II.121
It seems clear that the goal of The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles is to
make an in-depth, historically-grounded exploration of one country’s
experiences in order to show that existing theories about tax havens are
inadequately conceptualized and contextualized and, therefore, inadequately
116. Interview with Diane M. Ring, supra note 81.
117. Id.
118. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75.
119. Id.
120. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 441–47. Attractive Complexity, discussed above
in Part II.B, also serves heuristic purposes by impugning an established theory about the
desirability of simplification, thereby highlighting the need for a new theory. Dean, supra note
12, at 467. However, as discussed above, the principal goal of that case study appears to be
theory-testing in nature. See supra notes 90–102.
121. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 391–96.
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theorized.122
In much of the literature about tax havens, scholars
conventionally suggest that countries deliberately employ certain tax law and
related regulatory strategies for the sole purpose of gaming the international
tax system for financial advantage at the expense of rich, capital-exporting
countries like the United States.123 In contrast, The Saga of the Netherlands
Antilles states that its goal is to use the experience of the Netherlands Antilles
“as a lens through which to examine [how] onshore [legal systems] and the
international regulatory climate may affect international financial centers, both
onshore and offshore.”124 The goal of exploring the Netherlands Antilles is to
show that there is a heretofore unknown or unacknowledged context that
explains the legal systems in this country, and that the knowledge of this
context illuminates deep flaws in the conventional theories surrounding tax
havens.125
The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles thus demonstrates a heuristic purpose
for undertaking a case study: The goal is to introduce a host of new factors to
the tax literature that must inform any future attempt to consider the role of,
and international response to, tax havens.126 Tax havens have been an
enormously popular subject of research in international tax law scholarship,
but the theorizing has mainly occurred in the absence of the kind of detailed
context explored in The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles.127 As a heuristic
case, the history of the Netherlands Antilles as an offshore financial center
provides both a rich source of context and a reason to pursue alternative
theories about managing the goals of taxation in a world of financially
integrated markets.
As the foregoing typology of case study research design suggests, case
studies may be used for several different purposes, and the reader may be
served by knowing the goals of the research. Unfortunately, it is not always
clear which purpose the author is pursing in the studies discussed above. One
way in which the social science literature might prove helpful to legal scholars
122. See id. at 451.
123. See generally Adam Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010) (reviewing the literature on tax havens) (on file with author).
124. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383.
125. Id. at 426–27.
126. Id.
127. Some examples of international tax articles on international tax include: Hugh J. Ault,
The Importance of International Cooperation in Forging Tax Policy, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1693
(2001); Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 81 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99
(2009); Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax
Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (2007); Lorraine
Eden & Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens: Renegade States in the International Tax Regime?, 27
LAW & POL’Y 100 (2005); Papali’i T. Scanlan, Globalisation and Tax-related Issues: What are
the Concerns?, in INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: GLOBALISATION AND FISCAL
SOVEREIGNTY 43 (Rajiv Biswas ed., 2002).
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is simply to impose some discipline with respect to the description of research
goals.128 These disciplines developed typologies of research purposes in order
to be systemic about gathering and assessing data such that scholars and their
readers could be more confident about the claims made with respect to the
outcomes of the research.129
The typologies serve as a guide—not necessarily binding, but useful as a
starting point—for being more explicit about the goals sought to be
accomplished by using case studies instead of or in addition to the standard
approaches to legal scholarship.130 Using the social science literature might
help legal scholars explain their scholarly goals more explicitly and give the
reader a better sense of the reasons the author chose a case study over other
means of making a scholarly point. Once readers understand why the author
has chosen a case study in the first place, they may better critique the fit
between the case and the stated objective.
III. CHOOSING THE CASE: WHY THIS CASE?
Once the author has determined to study a case in order to develop
international tax law theory, the author must choose “the” case to be studied.
Again, with reference to the social science literature, specific cases may be
studied because they serve specific research purposes. Four general categories
of cases described in the social science literature seem most suited to
describing the international tax case studies: 1) representative cases—a typical
or standard example of a wider category;131 2) atypical or “deviant cases”—
those that deviate from the expected;132 3) crucial cases—either those
considered most likely to demonstrate a given theory that do not, or those
considered least likely to support a theory that do, in fact, support the theory;133
and 4) archetypal cases—defining cases, in the sense that the case studied
became a model that influenced subsequent cases of the same type.134 Each of
these types of cases is described in the context of the international tax case
studies below.

128. Livingston, supra note 3, at 415.
129. Id. at 368.
130. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 103 (“Aiming at the disciplined application of theories to cases
forces one to state theories more rigorously than might otherwise be done.”).
131. Isidora Djurić et al., Letter to Editor, The Role of Case Study Method in Management
Research, 5 SERBIAN J. MGMT. 175, 177 (2010).
132. See, e.g., Ali Kazancigil, The Deviant Case in Comparative Analysis: High Stateness in
a Muslim Society: The Case of Turkey, in COMPARING NATIONS: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES,
SUBSTANCE 213–14 (Mattei Dogan & Ali Kazancigil eds., 1994).
133. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 118.
134. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 178.
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Representative Cases

Most of the international tax law case studies may be viewed as
representative in nature, although only Stages of International Taxation states
explicitly that the case was chosen because it represents events or phenomena
of the general kind being studied.135 The author states that he chose to study
the use by multinational corporations of thin-capitalization/earnings-stripping
techniques because these techniques are “the best representative example” of
the problems of attempts by governments to separate abusive tax-motivated
transactions from ordinary business transactions.136 In making the case that the
international tax regime created an unworkable anti-avoidance paradigm,
Stages of International Taxation uses the case of the earnings-stripping rules as
a typical strategy employed by governments to prevent taxpayers from
engaging in excessive tax avoidance.137
None of the other case studies examined explicitly characterizes the nature
of the case studied, but six, in addition to Stages of International Taxation,
appear to be representative.
These are Internet Taxation,138 Digital
Biosphere,139 One Nation,140 International Tax Relations,141 The Sovereignty
Debate,142 and The Bermuda Loophole.143 Each of these articles implies that
the studied subject is one of a class of like subjects, often (but not always) by
referring to or directly providing some empirically observable evidence of
likeness. For example, in Internet Taxation, the author suggests that Burkina
Faso is representative of other developing countries because its “economy and
policies mirror that of similarly situated countries.”144 In Digital Biosphere,
the author implies that the subject of its case study, Wal-Mart, might be
representative of a class by stating that “there are many more click-and-mortars
that are attempting to use similar entity isolation strategies.”145 In The
Bermuda Loophole, the author suggests that Bermuda is one of a class of “taxefficient jurisdictions” by suggesting that if rules were changed with respect to

135. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 676.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 674.
138. Budnick, supra note 12.
139. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12.
140. Ring, One Nation, supra note 12.
141. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3.
142. Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12.
143. Seessel, supra note 12.
144. Budnick, supra note 12, at 556. I make the same suggestion in Taxation for Investment
and Aid, but, for the reasons discussed below, I characterize Ghana as a “crucial case.”
Christians, supra note 12, at 712; see infra notes 153–63 and accompanying text.
145. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 373.
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Bermuda, taxpayers would simply move their money to an alternate
jurisdiction in the class.146
Each of these statements suggest that—for the purpose of developing this
kind of case study—the fact that empirical evidence could presumably be
marshaled to demonstrate the purported like class is sufficient to support the
proposition that the case studied is worthy of study because it represents a
larger body of like cases. The authors assume that the case is relevant for
studying the asserted phenomenon based on a claim that there are other cases
like this one out there—which we presumably do not need to study since we
are studying this one. The prospect of selection bias discussed above147
appears to be most problematic in this context, since we do not have studies of
the other cases of which the instant case is representative. Describing
qualitatively whether and why we think our cases are representative might help
us assess the credibility of the claims and proposals we make. In other words,
the qualitative approach that forces us to confront the assumptions underlying
our articulation of cases in international tax scholarship might also help us to
contextualize our specific case more effectively.
B.

Atypical or Deviant Cases

In contrast to representative cases, a scholar pursues atypical or deviant
cases to illuminate the exceptional.148 Atypical cases ask why something that
was expected to happen did not happen.149 Just one of the international tax
case studies appears to typify a deviant case study, namely Attractive
Complexity. The article is not explicit in this characterization, but describes a
situation involving international tax rule formation in which if a stated theory
were true, a certain result should have occurred, but did not.150 Finding that
the expected result did not occur, the author states that an alternative theory
must be developed to explain the events that occurred in contravention of the

146. Seessel, supra note 12, at 568 (“[E]ven if the Treasury or Congress closes the loophole
with respect to Bermuda, the reinsurance business would shift to other tax efficient jurisdictions
. . . .”).
147. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
148. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75.
149. Odell, supra note 8, at 166 (“When a body of theory is fairly well developed and
substantial evidence has confirmed it, a detailed study of a deviant case can be illuminating. . . .
An anomaly sometimes can suggest new hypotheses that also account for cases previously
thought accounted for.”).
150. Dean, supra note 12, at 407 (“If it were true that the tax law’s ever-increasing
complexity was merely a product of political failure, the check-the-box election, by all accounts a
political success story, should have unambiguously diverted public and private resources away
from the tax law.”).
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prevailing theory.151 Consistent with atypical cases in general, Attractive
Complexity uses the atypical case of the formation of the entity classification
rules to “tidy up our understanding of exceptions and anomalies” or “to
identify underlying causes.”152
C. Crucial Cases
The crucial case study is premised on the idea of showing that a theory
works even in the least likely conditions or, conversely, does not work even in
the most likely conditions.153 If a scholar can show a theory works in
conditions where it should not, it is likely to be valid in all other circumstances
as well; conversely, a theory that “fails to work even in the most favorable
conditions can quickly be dismissed.”154 As one example of a “least likely”
case from the social science literature, a researcher tested his thesis that all
organizations become dominated by a ruling elite by examining the ruling
structure of socialist parties.155 His theory was that since socialist parties are
organizations committed to the norm of internal democracy, it would be very
unlikely that such an organization would be dominated by a ruling elite.156 If
oligarchy existed in this “least likely” case (as it did), it would also likely apply
to other organizations that lacked a democratic culture.157
On the other hand, the social science literature suggests that “[a] single
crucial case may certainly score a clean knockout over a theory.”158 I did not
identify any “least likely” cases in the international tax law literature.
151. Id. (“Concluding that the check-the-box election failed to produce a clear improvement
in simplicity and that the tax law’s complexity has not been significantly affected by the public’s
growing interest in simplification would suggest an alternative explanation of complexity’s
relentless advance.”).
152. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 178; Kazancigil, supra note 132, at 214.
153. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 177–78.
154. Id. at 178; see also Odell, supra note 8, at 165–67.
155. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., 1915)
(analyzing the characteristics of political parties during the rise of the nation-state to learn about
the characteristics individuals seek in political leaders).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 127;
Probably the closest a single case study can come to approximating a neutral test would
be when the researcher selects an extreme case that is highly unlikely to confirm, and
finds that even this case does so. Such a least-likely case study would provide strong,
though not unqualified, support for the inference that the theory is even more likely to be
valid in most other cases, where contrary winds do not blow as strongly.
Odell, supra note 8, at 165. Others suggest that this conclusion places too much weight on one
case, and assumes a narrow theory-testing role for case studies that may not be appropriate. See,
e.g., GERRING, supra note 31, at 118 (“[N]o single-case test can offer strong confirmation of the
theory.”).
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However, one article, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid,159 may typify its
corollary, the “most likely” case. In that article, I state that the case study
involves a country, Ghana, that is a likely candidate for a treaty, and that if a
treaty between the United States and Ghana would not provide the benefits
commonly attributed to tax treaties, then the theory that tax treaties provide
such benefits must not hold.160 The aim of the case study is to question the
validity of the theory that tax treaties can have a positive impact on trade and
investment.161 Yet, as the social science literature demonstrates, caution
should be used in determining that the case is, in fact, “most likely” and in
determining what conclusions can be drawn from the evidence provided by the
single case.162 The social science literature might suggest that additional cases
should be identified and studied to increase the certainty that the initial
conclusion remains plausible.163
D. Archetypal Cases
Archetypal cases constitute a defining case—that is, something that the
author argues sets the stage for everything that follows.164 Within the
international tax literature studied, only The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles is
an archetypal case. In that article, the authors suggest that the Netherlands
Antilles set the stage for “offshore finance.”165 It may be that the Netherlands
Antilles is now a representative case (i.e., it is one of a certain class of
countries), such that studying the Netherlands Antilles may give us insight into
how these other countries operate. We might want to suggest, for example,
that the Netherlands Antilles is like other “tax havens” or other “offshore
finance centers.” As discussed above, such a claim would be more credible to
the extent we could offer more empirical description of the relevant
characteristics. Indeed, as various efforts to curb international tax evasion
have illustrated, defining the term “tax haven” has required extensive attention

159. Christians, supra note 12.
160. Id. at 644.
161. Id.
This case study demonstrates that in today’s global tax climate, a typical tax treaty would
not provide significant tax benefits to current or potential investors. . . . [and that] much of
the conventional wisdom about the impact of tax treaties on the global flow of investment
does not apply in the context of many of the LDCs most in need of realizing the benefits
attributed to these agreements.
Id. at 644, 712.
162. See, e.g., Odell, supra note 8, at 172 (pointing out the potential short-comings of the
single-case approach).
163. See id. (implying that additional cases will strengthen a conclusion).
164. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 178; see also WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 109 (2003).
165. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383.
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to (and suffered from the lack of) qualitative empirical evidence.166 But The
Saga of the Netherlands Antilles does not necessarily direct us to examine this
problem. Rather, the point of this archetypal case seems to be that, but for the
specific historical developments in the Netherlands Antilles, the phenomenon
we now identify as “offshore finance” would not exist in its current form.167
As a result, the history of this particular country is presented as intrinsically
interesting, as well as significantly impacting succeeding events.
Categorizing cases into social science types is informative as well as
cautionary. The fact that most of the cases fit into a few categories might
reveal some key assumptions legal scholars make about the nature of
knowledge and what is needed to convince an audience that a claim or
proposition ought to be viewed as worthy of attention—if not deference—in
future decision-making. We may view our generally light documentation of
the ways in which the chosen case is like or unlike other cases, compared to
our relatively more thorough documentation of the substance of the cases
themselves, as illustrative of what legal scholars perceive as important to the
function of legal scholarship.
The caution is that failing to think about our cases in terms of what they
are a case of may lead us—both authors and readers of international tax
scholarship—to make assumptions and draw conclusions that will not
withstand, and may even be contradicted by, the cold light of implementation
in the understudied context. If we are more reflective about the universe of
possible cases and contexts, we may be more deliberate in our approach to the
case and in our assessment of what we find. Categorizing our case studies
within a social science framework provides a means of thinking about why we
are undertaking cases in the first place. But it also forces us to consider more
carefully how we ought to make the case.
IV. BUILDING THE CASE: METHODS AND SOURCES
How do international tax law scholars approach their cases? None of the
international tax case studies includes a description of the author’s reasoning
regarding how the case is or should be constructed. Instead, the case studies
evidence an approach that is common to tax law scholarship: Narratives are
built by gathering and analyzing relevant facts and authoritative legal
doctrines.168 Much of the narrative is drawn from what might be described as
standard sources of tax-related legal research and the standard approaches to
legal argumentation—“standard” because they are the prevailing sources and
166. See Christians, supra note 127, at 122–24.
167. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383 (stating that this case is “an important
contribution given the historic role played by the island’s financial sector in the overall
development of offshore finance”).
168. See Livingston, supra note 3, at 374–75.
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approaches used in tax law scholarship.169 In the context of the international
tax case studies, both the litany of sources and the approach to analysis reflect
decisions that the authors made regarding what they believed was needed to
“make the case.”170
Accordingly, international tax case study authors use all of the primary
source materials that are familiar to tax law scholars in general, including tax
and other statutes,171 tax treaties,172 and court cases,173 as well as Treasury and
agency guidance,174 legislative history,175 and other congressional and
executive materials.176 They also use the standard secondary sources
commonly employed in constructing tax law scholarship, such as other law
review and journal articles,177 tax trade publication articles,178 scholarly and
popular books,179 newspaper and other media accounts,180 and other guidance

169. Id. at 376–78.
170. See, e.g., Interview with Diane M. Ring, supra note 81. The approach to case study
research is “almost self-evident,” and implied by the kind of case the author wishes to make: “I
wanted to do something that’s not vague or insufficiently concrete to persuade, something that the
reader could envision.” Id.
171. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 639 n.12, 640 n.16 (citing Internal Revenue Code
provisions and other United States statutes); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12,
at 1176 n.15, 1178 n.16 (citing Internal Revenue Code provisions and other United States
statutes).
172. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 12, at 640–41 n.4 (citing United States tax treaties with
Barbados, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela); Cockfield, Transforming the
Internet, supra note 12, at 1187 n.50 (citing a U.S.-India tax treaty).
173. See, e.g., Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1201 n.104 (citing a
United States Supreme Court case).
174. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 682 n.165 (citing the United States Treasury
1996 Model Income Tax Convention); Christians, supra note 12, at 647 n.22 (citing a Treasury
press release); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1178 n.17 (citing the
United States Treasury 1996 Model Income Tax Convention).
175. See, e.g., Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1201 n.106 (citing a
Congressional bill).
176. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 693 n.211 (citing Joint Committee on Taxation
publications); Budnick, supra note 12, at 556 n.52 (citing U.S. CIA World Factbook); Christians,
supra note 12, at 639 n.1 (citing U.S. CIA World Factbook); Cockfield, Transforming the
Internet, supra note 12, at 1174–75 n.12 (citing the Advisory Commission Report to Congress
and GAO Report on e-commerce).
177. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 633–36 nn.1–7; Budnick, supra note 12, at 552
n.19; Christians, supra note 12, at 640 n.2; Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12,
at 1173 n.7.
178. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 671 n.137 (citing an article in Tax Notes
International); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1176 n.15 (citing an article
in Tax Notes).
179. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 643 n.23, 645 n.30; Cockfield, Transforming the
Internet, supra note 12, at 1173 nn.7 & 9.
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and commentary from institutional sources like the American Law Institute,181
the United Nations,182 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.183
International tax case study authors also employ the kinds of approaches
that are common in the tax law literature—namely, persuasion via thorough,
extensive documentation. Thus, much of the international tax case study
scholarship, like much other tax law scholarship, is designed to illustrate,
demonstrate, or prove the accuracy of the author’s perspective on how tax
rules, regimes, or practices operate or should operate.184 Similarly, much of
the international tax case study scholarship, like much other tax law
scholarship, makes the case for a proposed change of rules185 or for adopting
the author’s view of an event or phenomenon.186 Scholars accomplish these
objectives by producing relevant facts and doctrines, explaining why these
facts and doctrines are relevant and important and how they fit together, and
making persuasive statements about why their narrative compels the reader to
draw certain conclusions.
180. See, e.g., Budnick, supra note 12, at 549 n.2, 550 n.3 (citing an Internet news story and
an African news media account); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1172
nn.1, 2 & 5, 1186 n.47 (citing Time magazine, an Internet news story, an Associated Press story,
and The Economist).
181. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 659 n.85 (citing an ALI Tax Advisory Group
draft proposal).
182. See, e.g., Budnick, supra note 12, at 550 n.9 (citing an UNCTAD report); Cockfield,
Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1186 n.49 (citing the U.N. Model Tax Treaty).
183. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 664 n.103, 674–75 n.147; Budnick, supra note
12, at 557 n.57; Christians, supra note 12, at 647 n.21; Cockfield, Transforming the Internet,
supra note 12, at 1174 n.10, 1175 n.13.
184. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 686–87 (demonstrating the inadequacies of the antiavoidance paradigm); Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383 (showing how the “onshore” legal
systems and “the international regulatory climate may affect other international financial centers,
both onshore and offshore”); Budnick, supra note 12, at 579–80 (showing how e-commerce tax
rules impact developing countries); Christians, supra note 12, at 712 (discussing why there are
few tax treaties between the United States and developing countries); Cockfield, Digital
Biosphere, supra note 12, at 403 (showing how traditional tax laws are ill-equipped to deal with
e-commerce practices); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1175 (showing
how regulators developed e-commerce tax rules “while striving to preserve existing international
tax principles”); Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 79 (showing how tax arbitrage works); Ring,
Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at 159 (showing how individuals use the concept of
sovereignty to advance different policy positions in tax); Seessel, supra note 12, at 542–43
(illustrating how income is tax sheltered through tax havens).
185. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 629–30 (arguing adoption of his proposed treatment for
arbitrage).
186. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 634 (arguing for his view of stages of development of
international tax theory); Dean, supra note 12, at 467 (arguing for his view of taxpayer attitudes
about simplicity); Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 153–54 (arguing for her
view of the coherence of the international tax system as a regime).
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However, many of the international tax case studies also employed
approaches and used sources that differ from these traditional standards,
reflecting a more qualitative research instinct. These approaches include both
gathering non-standard source material and analyzing standard source
materials in non-standard ways. For example, three of the case studies are
expressly constructed using information gathered through personal interviews
with individual legal practitioners, judges, government officials, and other
relevant parties.187 It is not uncommon for tax scholars to cite a single
interview or an e-mail correspondence for a particular proposition, but
extensive qualitative interviewing is a rarity in international tax law
scholarship.188
Other scholars similarly engaged in some form of qualitative interviewing,
but did not document this data when constructing their cases. That is, at least
some of the authors spoke to one or more individuals with personal experience
and knowledge on the subject of the study, and whom the authors perceived to
be credible sources of information.189 These authors—perhaps like many legal
scholars—used their discussions with these individuals to better understand the
studied subject or to construct theories about the studied subject, but they did
not cite to the primary source of data—namely, notes from interviews or e-mail
correspondence.
In addition to qualitative interviewing, many of the case studies used social
science approaches to examine standard source material in ways that may be
considered unconventional in international tax law scholarship. One study
used recorded statements of key government officials and commentators, a
common source of citation in international tax law scholarship, but used the
comments in a non-standard way—namely, by engaging in rhetorical analysis
of these sources.190 Another study used information found in company filings
as a primary source material, a relatively less common source of citation in tax
law scholarship.191

187. See, e.g., Boise & Morris, supra note 16 (using data from thirteen referenced
interviews); Christians, supra note 12 (using data from seven referenced interviews); Cockfield,
Transforming the Internet, supra note 12 (using data from one referenced interview).
188. The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles and Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid are the
sole instances of international tax law scholarship constructed through qualitative interviewing of
which I am aware.
189. Interview with Steven A. Dean, supra note 39 (stating he consulted with law firm partner
knowledgeable on the check-the-box regime); Telephone Interview with Ben Seessel (Mar. 19,
2010) (on file with author) (stating he spoke to former law firm partner with knowledge on the
general area of law).
190. See, e.g., Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at 187–89.
191. See Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1181 n.29 (citing interview
with company vice president of legal affairs), 1180 nn.26–27 (referring to a company’s annual
SEC reports).
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Although none of these articles articulated why additional or different
sources or approaches might be necessary or useful in the research, it seems
clear that some kind of empirical study allowed the authors to understand
context and build theory. Thus, in The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, the
authors construct a history of the Netherlands Antilles as an offshore financial
center though the use of some standard legal source material: legislative
records, scholarly articles, information available on institutional websites,
industry and interest group reports, media accounts of events, and statements
by policy commentators at conferences.192 Similarly, in Tax Treaties for
Investment and Aid, I constructed economic, social, and political attributes of a
particular country, Ghana, through standard legal source material.193 But in
each case study, the authors also conducted interviews which they used to help
construct their narrative.
The authors employed these interviews for a range of pedagogic purposes.
First, interview data was used to make assertions about facts, including facts
that are or could be reinforced with other documented sources.194 The data
was also used to explain why an event happened historically, often in ways that
seem to create links that the outsider might not otherwise find significant.195 In
a few instances, interview data was used to explain what a legal doctrine
required or prohibited.196 Interview data was also used to describe (positively
or negatively) political or social contexts of events or states,197 to characterize
people, places, or events, especially in a narrative or informal format using
metaphor or analogy,198 and to infer or estimate facts not otherwise
available.199
What may not be as clear from the set of the interview data in these case
studies is the extent to which the interviewing was instrumental in more
fundamental ways, beyond its usefulness in providing citations to specific
points. For example, although it is not obvious from the manner in which the
192. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 379 n.4.
193. Christians, supra note 12, at 640 n.2.
194. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 394 nn.102–04, 404 n.75; Christians, supra note 12,
at 684–85 n.189, 689 n.211, 702 n.270.
195. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 394 n.100, 395 n.104, 411 n.226, 416 n.255, 421
n.286, 424 n.301, 432 nn.340–41, 434 n.348, 437 n.361.
196. Id. at 404 nn.176–77, 422–23 n.296.
197. Christians, supra note 12, at 701 n.269.
198. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 394 n.101, 405 (likening a group’s expertise to “three
donkeys and six dinosaurs”), 406 (describing an event as “like finding gold”), 419 (describing an
event as “then disaster struck” and a change of circumstances as “a ‘new wind’ was blowing”),
421 (“[T]he United States is a lot better off without [the Antilles tax treaty].”), 422–23 n.292, 426
(describing the impact of a legal-doctrine change on a population as ‘“slaughtered’ and
‘absolutely run over’”), 433–34 (describing the relationship between two countries as “[i]f you
stand in the ring with Mike Tyson”).
199. Id. at 432 n.340.
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interview data was used in Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid,200 as the
author of that study, I am aware that I conducted many of my interviews
primarily to learn about and understand the complicated social and political
contexts of my subject matter because I believed that my understanding would
be incomplete if obtained solely through the standard sources of legal
research.201 My goal was to test what is written about tax issues by learning
how people who were living and working within the specific context perceived
these issues from their different perspectives.202
The common theme of the uses of interview data in these two case studies
is that the data was evidently instrumental in presenting a narrative about a
sequence of events, contextualizing known facts, and linking facts for the
reader.203 What is missing from the literature and what might make the data
even more compelling, is a discussion about the authors’ objectives, processes,
and reasoning for collecting and using the data—especially in the case of
qualitative interviewing.204 In other words, as in the context of determining
what defines a case and what constitutes a case study, the international tax law
scholarship might better achieve its objectives by consulting literature on
epistemology, especially in the social sciences where researchers have
methodically studied how knowledge may be reliably generated through
qualitative means such as interviewing.205
For example, international tax case study scholarship might benefit from
applying some of the methods social scientists use to test their data to ensure
the credibility of their assertions. Perhaps the most useful tool in this area
would be the concept of triangulation, which in simple terms means scientists

200. Christians, supra note 12.
201. See Stake, supra note 4, at 453 (“What details of life the researchers are unable to see for
themselves is [sic] obtained by interviewing people who did see them or by finding documents
recording them.”).
202. See Joel Slemrod, Tax Principles in an International Economy, in WORLD TAX REFORM,
supra note 2, at 11, 13 (“A discussion of tax principles in an international economy must come to
terms with the real world, where the implementation of certain tax systems, which may be
desirable in theory, is extremely difficult.”).
203. See Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln, Introduction: The Discipline and Practice
of Qualitative Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1, 19 (“In writing, the fieldworker makes a claim to moral and scientific authority.”).
204. See id. at 5 (“Qualitative research is inherently multi-method in focus, . . . a strategy that
adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry.”).
205. See Stake, supra note 4, at 455 (cautioning that “[case researchers] will, like others, pass
along to readers some of their personal meanings of events and relationships—and fail to pass
along others.”); see also id. at 456 (“[T]he [case] researcher decides what the case’s ‘own story’
is, or at least what will be included in the report. More will be pursued than was volunteered, and
less will be reported than was learned.”). Because it consists in making representations,
qualitative research cannot overcome the fact that “[o]bjective reality can never be captured.”
Denzin & Lincoln, supra note 203, at 5.
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often test the outcomes they derive from one method of research by obtaining
the same results from another method of research.206 The use of qualitativelygathered data by international tax scholars suggests that one of our main ways
of using this data is to confirm or bolster factual statements which are, or could
be, available from different sources. This suggests that international tax
scholars are already engaging in some effort to triangulate, even if this effort is
not explicitly stated.207 Being more explicit about that process could improve
our confidence (and the confidence of our readers) in the conclusions we draw
from our research. This is not to say that tax law case studies must look like or
try to emulate social science case studies in terms of methodology.208 But I do
suggest that social science discourse on the promises and perils of case studies
ought to inform the way tax scholars view and present the usefulness of case
studies in international tax law scholarship.
Perhaps the most significant observation of this work is how useful a
qualitative social science approach can be for developing theory. In most, and
perhaps all, of the articles studied here, the authors were able to articulate
theories about international taxation only after gathering some amount of
empirical data—whether through interviewing or studying texts—and writing
about the specific case. For example, Professor Dean had an intrinsic interest
in the check-the-box regulations which, upon close study of the regulatory
history underlying the change to the rules, revealed to him the inconsistency of
articulation regarding simplicity as a valid policy goal for international tax
law.209 Studying the case provided a rich context for thinking about
simplification as a rhetorical substitute for very different political goals.
Similarly, in my own work, I wanted to understand why the United States
has so few tax treaties with Sub-Saharan African countries despite many other
trade and aid relationships with these countries. Only after studying the
economic and social relationships between the United States and one SubSaharan African country was I emboldened to develop a theory about the
purely symbolic nature of tax treaties between developed and developing
countries. Professors Boise and Morriss clearly developed a theory about the

206. Laurel Richardson & Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre, Writing: A Method of Inquiry, in THE
SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 959, 963; Stake, supra note 4, at 453–54 (“To reduce the
likelihood of misinterpretation, various procedures are employed, two of the most common being
redundancy of data gathering and procedural challenges to explanations.”).
207. One reason for failing to articulate a scholar’s research method is that legal audiences are
uninterested in these issues. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Tax’s Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 75
(1996) (“I sense that contemporary audiences are easily bored with discussions of pure
methodology.”).
208. See Macaulay, supra note 27, at 1177–82 (discussing ways in which legal scholars can
use some of the tools of social science without necessarily forcing us to “master social science
method, enlist good partners, or both”).
209. Interview with Steven A. Dean, supra note 39.
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nature of tax haven evolution by learning from the contemporary and historical
context.210 Theory develops as knowledge emerges through empirical study of
social, economic, and political contexts. We could do a better job of studying
and understanding these contexts by consulting literature that directly
addresses the question of how to learn from observation.
V. ASSESSING THE CASE
The final aspect of analyzing the international tax case studies involves the
assessment of the applicability or explanatory value of the case(s) studied: “[I]t
is one thing to marshal the facts, and another to know what to make of the
facts.”211 As in other aspects of the international tax case studies, authors are
not typically explicit about the criteria they use to assess the pedagogic value
of their cases.212 Most, however, do draw some substantive conclusions
specifically from the cases studied.213 Perhaps most problematic from the
perspective of social science work on the validity of conclusions drawn from
research, most international tax case studies draw fairly broad conclusions
without discussing the criteria used to determine whether, and to what extent,
the observations drawn from the case ought to be viewed as generalizable to
other cases or to international tax theory in general.214
An examination of the conclusions international tax scholars draw from
their case studies suggests that most believe their conclusions are generalizable
in some way. Several propose that the case study is generalizable in terms of
explaining an event or phenomenon. For example, Stages of International
Taxation advocates that the conclusions drawn from studying the case of the
earnings-stripping rules are generalizable to explain failure in the international
tax law system.215 The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles indicates that the case
explains both a general phenomenon (offshore finance) and predicts future
phenomena (the prospects for offshore finance going forward).216

210. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383.
211. Dennis Patterson, Response, The Limits of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us: Comments
on Daniel Keating’s “Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action,” 98 MICH. L. REV. 2738, 2738
(2000).
212. Diane Ring is the most explicit. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
213. Not all authors do so, however. Ring, One Nation, supra note 12 (explicitly refusing to
draw conclusions from the cases she studied).
214. This point relates back to the prior discussion on selection bias, supra Part II.
215. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 636, 686 (stating that the case “is reflective of a more
profound systemic failure in the [international income tax regime]” and that the case “is a
reflection of the anti-avoidance paradigm as a whole”).
216. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 426–27.
[F]rom the experience of the Antilles one can discern the contours of a theory that
explains the relatively brief arc of that jurisdiction’s success as an offshore financial
intermediary and offers insight into the future prospects of both the Antilles and other
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International Tax Relations suggests the cases studied demonstrate that regime
theory can help explain the international tax regime.217
Two of the case studies imply that their cases are generalizable to
populations other than those studied. Both Internet Taxation and Tax Treaties
for Investment and Aid suggest that conclusions drawn from the case studies
involving one country—Burkina Faso and Ghana, respectively—are
generalizable to other developing countries.218 Both articles make some
references to explain why the cases involving these countries ought to be
viewed as applicable to other, similarly situated countries.219 In Internet
Taxation, the author suggests that Burkina Faso’s “economy and policies
mirror that of similarly situated countries.”220 In Tax Treaties for Investment

offshore financial centers in the twenty-first century. . . . The rise and fall of the Antilles
suggests four critical propositions for the offshore financial sector at large.
Id. at 426–27.
217. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 148, 151 (discussing how regime
theory is an explanatory model for the double tax treaty regime and can bring “coherence and
organization” to the study of international tax. “[T]he double taxation case study demonstrates
how international relations theory and methodology can contribute to our understanding of even
the most familiar of international tax stories.”). Ring is most explicit about the value of cases. Id.
at 151–52 (“[I]t will be valuable to develop a stable of case studies to help identify common
issues, patterns, and problems, and to serve as a database for testing various aspects of regime
theory.”). More case studies and institutional analysis could help test this theory. Ring is also
explicit about the nature of generalizing. Id. at 153 (“Through analysis of international tax case
studies, we can identify common themes in the regime experience in international tax that may be
generalized and may enable us to predict where and when regime formation efforts are likely to
be successful and how that success can be fostered.”).
218. Budnick, supra note 12, at 568 (“[Burkina Faso’s] numbers suggest that developing
countries will not necessarily be harmed in the future by current international [tax] policy.”).
Further, Burkina Faso’s loss of tax revenue seems to be based more on its internal choices than as
a result of the WTO ban on e-commerce taxation. Id. at 569 (“[T]he present WTO ban should
remain in place as presently formulated. Although the ban does result in disproportionate losses
in percentage terms for developing countries, when placed within the context of a single country,
these losses appear minimal.”). “This data [showing minimal losses to Burkina Faso] would
indicate that not in all situations are developing nations unfairly prejudiced [by the WTO ban, but
would be] adversely affected by the imposition of residence-based taxation.” Id. at 579. See also
Christians, supra note 12, at 712 (suggesting that the case of Ghana shows tax treaties are not
generally beneficial for developing countries and that the failure of tax treaties to provide benefits
explains why few tax treaties between the United States and developing countries exist).
219. Here, the question of whether the case is generalizable relates back to the discussion of
whether the case is representative, discussed in Part III, supra. Both of these articles claimed that
their cases were representative, so it seems straightforward to claim the conclusions drawn are
generalizable to other similar cases.
220. Budnick, supra note 12, at 556. The reasoning seems a bit circular: the case studied
claimed to be like other cases that are like it. In terms attributed to Abraham Lincoln, “People
who like this sort of thing will find this the sort of thing they like.” GEORGE W.E. RUSSELL,
COLLECTIONS AND RECOLLECTIONS 309–10 (1898).
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and Aid, I suggest that the failure of the theory of the beneficial nature of tax
treaties when applied to Ghana (a “most likely case”) makes it unlikely that tax
treaties will prove beneficial in cases involving other countries as well.221 The
social science literature suggests a more careful approach should be taken in
extrapolating across populations and that international tax law scholarship
might benefit from this caution.
Finally, three of the case studies suggest that the case demonstrates that a
specific tax policy ought to be adopted or continued. This claim is most
strongly made in Transforming the Internet,222 Digital Biosphere,223 and
Harnessing Tax Arbitrage.224 As discussed above in the context of choosing a
case, the potential issue in drawing policy prescriptions from one or even
several cases is that there may be means of determining whether and in what
ways the case might deviate or produce atypical results that might help bolster
policy claims.225 That is, to the extent that international tax scholars wish to
use case studies to advance a position on a specific tax policy direction, the
argument could be stronger if the reader had more confidence in the case used
to draw the conclusion.226 As in the other areas, international tax scholars

221. Christians, supra note 12, at 712.
222. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12.
The case study suggests that proposals to tax profits emanating from computer servers
will not be an effective solution. . . . [The] analysis suggests that a more effective
regulatory framework is required to govern the taxation of international e-commerce
transactions. . . . [and] show[s] how the virtual world can subvert regulatory attempts that
try to replicate real world rules and principles.
Id. at 1175–76, 1200, 1265.
223. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 373, 385–86 (suggesting that Wal-Mart’s
strategy will spread and have a negative effect on state and local government revenues; proposing
a change in tax policy to avoid this result; and stating that the case study shows “how traditional
tax laws that emphasize control over geographic space fail to achieve the appropriate balance
within the digital biosphere” and that the traditional rules “will lead to revenue losses and a
distortion in the marketplace as companies seek to develop tax-free online affiliates”).
224. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 629–30. The case study demonstrates “the distributional
and cooperative benefits of the approach proposed by this article.” Id. at 559. The case study
also evidences that existing approaches to international tax arbitrage cannot work. Id. at 558.
225. In this aspect, the international tax law scholarship may suffer from some of the same
problems faced in international legal scholarship more generally. See Joel P. Trachtman,
International Economic Law Research: A Taxonomy, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE
STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 43, 45 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008) (“[T]here is no
agreement on the theory and methodology of international law. This lack of consensus challenges
the very legitimacy of international law as an academic field.”).
226. Susan D. Franck, Essay, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment
Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 770–73 (2008) (asserting that international
legal scholars’ work could benefit by using empirical methods more often, as other legal scholars
and international scholars have done).
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could benefit from the work done by social scientists in examining the
promises and perils of drawing conclusions from our research.227
CONCLUSION
International tax law case studies demonstrate the range of political,
economic, and social contexts that inform theory about how best to approach
the taxation of international income.228 Three integrated characteristics appear
to describe case study research in the context of international tax legal
scholarship. First, international tax case studies are characterized by their
subject, i.e., the case. The case may be an event or a phenomenon that
involves, implicates, or explains aspects of the taxation of international
activities. Second, case studies are characterized by what may be defined as an
approach—namely, the author’s attempt to engage in a detailed exploration of
the case, mainly using sources and approaches familiar to legal scholarship, but
increasingly integrating sources and approaches common in other disciplines.
Third, international tax case studies are characterized in terms of their purpose.
International tax law scholars engage in case studies for a wide range of
purposes, from illustrative (the majority of the cases), to demonstrative (a few
cases), to proof-providing (even fewer cases).
We could do more, and better. Legal scholars’ use of case studies to
develop theory in international tax law is mostly implicit, and this article has
attempted to draw conclusions about the authors’ goals and purposes by
inference, as well as through the qualitative approach of interviewing the
authors themselves. But the primary purpose of this undertaking is more than

227. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975,
979–80 (2005) (discussing the growth of empiricism in international law recommending the use
of modern case studies); Kelley L. Mayer, Reform of United States Tax Rules Governing
Electronic Commerce Transfer Pricing, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 283, 302 (1999) (“[C]ase
studies should be conducted to determine the ramifications of applying different treaty provisions
to various countries in differing circumstances.”); Kunio Mikuriya, Summary Remarks at the
Second Joint WCO/OECD Conference on Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation (May 23,
2007), available at http://www.wcoomd.org/speeches/?v=1&lid=1&cid=7&id=51 (“At the global
level the WCO and the OECD should continue their existing cooperation relating to the sharing
of knowledge, the development of training material, and the e-learning module initiative. This
cooperation could be further enhanced by the suggestion to create a small focus group of customs
and tax experts to dialogue on and study issues involving the WTO and the business community
initially targeting practical and concrete case studies based on commercial realities.”). For an
argument that socio-legal perspectives on international law provide valuable information, see
Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1266
(2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005)).
228. Stake, supra note 4, at 460 (“Case studies are of value in refining theory, suggesting
complexities for further investigation as well as helping to establish the limits of
generalizability.”).
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that of documenting the contours of what I perceive as a valuable approach to
international tax law scholarship. It is, rather, to suggest that the growing use
of case studies to develop international tax theory could be expanded and
enriched by consulting the methodology considerations which inform social
science research. Audiences for social science research expect rigorous
analysis of empirical evidence in order to show us something about how the
world works. Audiences for international tax law, like audiences for legal
scholarship in general, have been content with the traditional, typically nonempirical, approach to case review. In a world of complex economic,
financial, and social relationships, using qualitative socio-legal methods to
study our cases represents our best hope of developing new knowledge and,
with it, new and better theory for international taxation.
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